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Abstract 
Prior research on the relationship between organizational slack and R&D 
(research and development) initiatives is inconclusive and confused. We aim to 
address the inconsistent research findings by employing the theory of the 
attention-based view of the firm to explain the ways in which organizational slack 
influences the degree to which organizations pursue R&D initiatives aggressively. 
First, we argue that organizational slack positively moderates a positive 
relationship between prior R&D commitments and current R&D initiatives by 
shifting the attention of organizational decision-makers from internal political 
bargaining to potential business opportunities uncovered through prior R&D 
commitments. Secondly, organizational slack attenuates a positive relationship 
between competitors’ R&D initiatives and the focal organization’s R&D initiatives 
by shifting the attention of organizational decision-makers from external changes, 
variations, and progress to internal issues. Finally, organizational slack reinforces 
a positive relationship between attainment discrepancy and R&D initiatives by 
shifting the attention of organizational decision-makers from risks entailed in 
R&D initiatives to the resolution of performance problems. Our findings inform 
our future efforts to reconcile mutually contradictory findings of the prior work on 
the relationship between organizational slack and R&D initiatives. We further 
discuss the implications of our findings for the hitherto underexamined aspect of 
organizational slack as an antecedent of managerial attention. 
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I. Introduction 
Various scholars have examined how organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981; 
Cyert & March, 1963) influences the extent to which organizations pursue 
initiatives characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and risk, or more 
specifically, research and development (R&D) initiatives. However, findings are 
mixed and confusing. Some scholars argue that organizational slack enables 
organizations to be more risk-seeking because organizational slack comprises 
excess resources that managers are allowed to use at their discretion without 
paying close attention to their accountability of their choices. Put differently, these 
scholars argue for the positive relationship between organizational slack and 
organizations’ R&D initiatives. On the other hand, other scholars argue that 
organizational slack hinders organizations’ initiative in the pursuit of R&D. Their 
rationale is that organizational slack renders managers risk averse. This is 
because organizational slack, as resources in excess of current business 
requirements, is characterized with less close relevance to the maximization of the 
firm value. As such, organizational slack is an indication that managers use their 
resources so inefficiently as to forgo potentially profitable opportunities. 
Consequently, these scholars argue that organizational slack has a negative 
influence on R&D initiatives. Furthermore, still other scholars argue for a 
curvilinear (or an inverted U-shape) relationship between organizational slack 
and R&D initiatives. They try to reconcile the two contradictory arguments 
discussed above concerning the influences of organizational slack on R&D 
initiatives; however, none explicitly indicate the reason why the relationship is an 
inverted U-shape rather than a U-shape. Furthermore, they do not provide an 
explicit argument concerning how the optimal amount of organizational slack (or 
the peak of an inversed U-shape) is to be determined. In short, there is still no 
agreement regarding the influence of organizational slack on R&D initiatives. 
One notable shortcoming of prior work is that the wide variety of motivations 
underlying organizations’ R&D initiatives is ignored. More specifically, prior 
scholars do not account for the differential mechanisms by which various 
motivations influence organizations’ decisions to allocate resources to R&D 
initiatives. For example, organizations may pursue R&D because they have made 
the prior decision to commit resources to certain directions of scientific or 
technological inquiry. It also may be possible that organizations are motivated to 
pursue R&D as a response to competitors’ initiatives. Accordingly, the degree to 
which managers are ready to honor prior commitments to R&D influences 
motivating effects of the prior R&D commitments, while motivating effects of 
competitors’ R&D depend on how precisely organizations monitor and recognize 
their competitors’ initiatives. As such, the mechanisms through which R&D 
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initiatives increase (or decrease) differ to the extent that underlying motivations 
vary. It may therefore be inappropriate to ignore the differential motivations and 
underlying mechanisms for R&D initiatives when we examine the relationship 
between organizational slack and R&D initiatives. 
Given the variation in organizations’ motivations and underlying 
mechanisms for R&D, it is of theoretical as well as practical importance to 
consider the possibility that organizational slack differentially influences R&D to 
the extent that motivations and underlying mechanisms for R&D differ. One of the 
often unspecified assumptions underlying the prior research is that organizations 
are motivated to pursue R&D initiatives for some reasons or others. This 
assumption is critical because if organizations are not motivated to pursue R&D, 
organizational slack would have no influence on R&D no matter how big 
organizational slack is available. Put differently, organizational slack influences 
R&D initiatives as long as organizations are motivated to pursue R&D for some 
reason or other. Accordingly, examining the influences of organizational slack on 
R&D initiatives without considering underlying motivations may risk 
oversimplifying complicated organizational processes such as resource allocation 
decisions regarding R&D. Therefore, our purpose in this manuscript is to reveal 
the possibility that organizational slack differentially influences the relationship 
between organizations’ various motivations for R&D and the degree to which they 
actively pursue R&D initiatives, or R&D intensity. In particular, we adopt the 
theory of the attention-based view of the firm (Blettner, He, Hu & Bettis, 2015; 
Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Li, Maggitti, Smith, Tesluk & Katila, 2013; Ocasio, 1997; 
Rerup, 2009) to uncover hitherto underexamined contingencies that characterize 
the influences of organizational slack on R&D initiatives. 
 
II. Review of prior work 
Organizational slack is defined as “that cushion of actual or potential 
resources which allows an organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures 
for adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy, as well as to initiate 
changes in strategy with respect to the external environment” (Bourgeois, 
1981:30). The prior work identifies three types of organizational slack: absorbed 
slack, unabsorbed slack, and potential slack (Bromiley, 1991; Bromiley & 
Washburn, 2011; Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986). They capture different aspects of 
organizational resources in excess of current business requirements. 
Absorbed slack is organizational slack that is distributed to particular usages, 
or “absorbed into the system design as excess costs” (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983:43). 
Examples of absorbed slack include excess inventory, excess machine capacity, and 
indirect staff (ibid.). Absorbed slack is considered excess resources because 
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comparable organizations are able to process identical tasks with fewer resources. 
It is also referred to as recoverable slack (ibid.) or low-discretion slack (Sharfman, 
Wolf, Chase & Tansik, 1988). 
On the other hand, unabsorbed slack is an alternative type of organizational 
slack that comprises excess, liquid, and uncommitted resources in an organization. 
Unabsorbed slack is also more readily redeployable than absorbed slack because it 
is not assigned to any particular usage (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Singh, 1986). 
The best examples of unabsorbed slack are cash and marketable securities. 
Scholars often operationalize the amount of unabsorbed slack by measuring such 
liquid assets in excess of short-term liabilities. Scholars also use the terms 
“available slack” (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983) and “high-discretion slack” (Sharfman 
et al., 1988) to refer to unabsorbed slack. 
Finally, potential slack is defined as the unused capacity to borrow from 
outside. When organizations maintain a sufficient capacity for additional 
borrowing, it adds to their unused, redeployable resources. Accordingly, potential 
slack is a third class of organizational slack that is as easily as redeployable as 
unabsorbed slack, but available only from outside the organization. 
Scholars identify wide variety of influences of organizational slack on 
behaviors of organizations, including adaptations to competitive dynamics (Cheng 
& Kesner, 1997; Smith, Grimm, Gannon & Chen, 1991; Thompson, 1967), the 
building of dominant coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963), political behaviors 
(Bourgeois & Singh, 1983), conflict resolution among dominant coalitions (Cyert & 
March, 1963), centralization (March & Olsen, 1984), bureaucratization (Cyert & 
March, 1963), risk preferences (Bromiley, 1991; Singh, 1986; Wiseman & Bromiley, 
1996), and innovation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). 
In other words, because organizational slack is excess resources that are not 
tied to specific usages in current operations, it can have a wide variety of 
influences on organizations depending on how it is used by managers. Partially 
due to such multi-dimensional characteristics of organizational slack, findings in 
prior research regarding the relationship between organizational slack and R&D 
is inconclusive and confused, as is discussed below. 
Adopting a behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), some 
scholars argue for a positive relationship between organizational slack and R&D 
initiatives. It is because managers are willing to take risks to the extent that 
organizational slack is available in their organizations (Greve, 2003). From the 
perspective of organizational capability, it also is argued that organizations 
strongly commit to R&D to the extent that they have sufficient excess resources to 
stabilize their investments year to year irrespective of annual fluctuations in 
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profits (O'Brien, 2003). This is because R&D contributes to competitive advantage 
only when continuous resource deployment is ensured. 
Other scholars strongly oppose these views by arguing for a negative 
relationship between organizational slack and R&D initiatives. For example, 
Palmer and Wiseman (1999) argue that organizations increase their R&D 
initiatives to the extent that their organizational slack decreases because 
organizations try to maintain a certain amount of organizational slack, below 
which organizations are motivated to search for alternative initiatives to recover 
the amount of available organizational slack. Other scholars who adopt the 
perspective of agency theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) argue that 
organizational slack allows managers to waste their resources on self-protecting 
behaviors, including excessive diversifications, empire-building, and on-the-job 
shirking, while risky initiatives like R&D are avoided (Latham & Braun, 2009). 
With these contradictory arguments in mind, yet other scholars argue for a 
curvilinear (an inverted U-shape) relationship between organizational slack and 
R&D initiatives (Geiger & Cashen, 2002; Kim, Kim & Lee, 2008). More specifically, 
organizational slack positively influences R&D initiatives up to a certain amount, 
above which the relationship turns into a negative one. Although a curvilinear (an 
inverted U-shaped) relationship reconciles the positive and negative perspectives 
concerning the influences of organizational slack on R&D initiatives, it still 
remains unclear why the relationship is an inverted U-shape rather than a 
U-shape. Furthermore, the proponents of the curvilinear (an inverted U-shaped) 
relationship do not provide any rationale concerning how the optimal amount of 
organizational resources is to be determined. 
In this manuscript, we aim to address the inconsistent findings of prior work 
by considering the differential motivations and underlying mechanisms for 
organizations’ R&D. We argue that it is important to focus on motivation because 
it is closely concerned with organizational attention, one of the key drivers of 
organizational adaptive capability (Blettner et al., 2015; Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Li 
et al., 2013; Ocasio, 1997; Rerup, 2009). Put differently, motivation drives 
attention, which then influences organizational performance. 
Organizational attention is defined as encompassing “the noticing, encoding, 
interpreting, and focusing of time and effort by organizational decision-makers on 
both (a) issues; the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the 
environment: problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers: the available 
repertoire of action alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and 
procedures” (Ocasio, 1997:189). Scholars identify important influences of 
organizational attention, including those on the valuation and legitimization of 
the repertoire of issues and answers available to decision-makers (Ocasio, 1997). 
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Attention also provides a structured system of interest and identities that 
motivates decision-makers’ action by structuring their decision premises (ibid.). 
The underlying assumption is that managers’ cognitive capacity is constrained or 
bounded (March & Simon, 1958; Simon, 1955). As cognitive capacity is bounded, 
the locus of attention is of substantial importance. Specifically, the 
straightforward consequence of this assumption of bounded rationality is that 
managers do not pay attention to all issues, but only to certain, casually selected 
ones. Accordingly, business opportunities, technologies, and issues that do not 
capture managers’ attention are not acted upon. Managers pay attention to only a 
limited number of issues, and the way in which those issues are selected 
substantially influences organizational performance. 
As such, managerial attention enables us to explain the manners in which 
identical resources could be used for a wide variety of differential usages. This is 
critically important in the study of organizational slack. As uncommitted 
resources that managers can use for a wide variety of usages, performance 
contribution of organizational slack does not depend on its characteristics per se 
but on managers’ decision to deploy organizational slack. In other words, it is 
critically important to take into account managers’ strategic as well as operational 
considerations underlying their usage of organizational slack when we examine 
performance influences of organizational slack. Accordingly, we aim to reconcile 
the inconsistent findings of the prior work by employing the attention-based view 
of the firm (Ocasio, 1997) to examine the performance influences of organizational 
slack. 
As argued above, organizations commit their resources to R&D initiatives as 
they are encouraged by various motivations. Accordingly, we focus on three of the 
most typical motivations for organizational R&D in particular. They are the 
pursuit of potential business opportunities, competitive adaptations, and efforts to 
address performance shortfalls or attainment discrepancies (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Lant, 1992; Lant & Montgomery, 1987). By building on the prior work, we discuss 
these three motivations in turn below; subsequently, how organizational slack may 
differentially influence R&D initiatives depending on different motivations and 
underlying mechanisms is discussed. 
 
III. Prior R&D commitments 
Organizations are the tools by which organizational goals are achieved. In 
business organizations, organizational goals entail maximizing profits by 
exploiting potential business opportunities. Accordingly, as one of critical business 
activities, R&D is also targeted to maximizing the realization of potential business 
opportunities. Put differently, one of the important motivations for R&D is the 
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pursuit of potential business opportunities identified by prior R&D initiatives. 
Therefore, we argue that organizations actively commit to current R&D initiatives 
to the extent that they have identified potential business opportunities through 
their prior R&D initiatives. 
Practically speaking, however, a substantial portion of prior commitments to 
R&D initiatives are maintained as vested rights granted to owners of those 
initiatives, rather than as a consequence of the strict and rational evaluation of 
expected future gains (Cyert & March, 1963). Notwithstanding a notoriously long 
lead-time before commercialization, resources allocated to R&D initiatives in the 
form of engineers, equipment, and facilities are very hard to undo. One reason why 
prior R&D commitments are maintained as vested rights is the high degree of 
uncertainty that characterizes gains from R&D initiatives. Managers need to wait 
a long time before they learn of the consequences of their decisions to commit 
resources to R&D initiatives. Consequently, commitments made to R&D initiatives 
are maintained as managers cannot predict their outcomes precisely. In short, a 
substantial portion of R&D initiatives undertaken by organizations are 
characterized as institutionalized search (Antonelli, 1989). 
However, such vested rights are difficult to honor to the extent that 
organizational slack is scarce. Organizational slack is instrumental in forming and 
maintaining dominant coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963), or groups of major 
decision-makers in organizations, as it enables managers to pursue their sub-goals 
without jeopardizing the achievements of overall organizational goals. The 
underlying assumption is that dominant coalition members agree upon overall 
organizational goals only to the extent that their sub-goals are satisfactorily 
pursued. Conversely, dominant coalitions grow unstable to the extent that 
organizational slack is scarce, thereby exacerbating goal disagreement among 
dominant coalition members (Bourgeois & Singh, 1983). In response, managers 
without sufficient organizational slack try to pursue their sub-goals by focusing 
their attention on internal political bargaining that entails “renegotiating the 
basic coalition agreement” (Cyert & March, 1963:122). Such renegotiation is often 
characterized by the exploitation of “the vulnerability of those activities in the 
organization for which the connection with major goals is difficult to calculate 
concretely (e.g., research in many firms)” (ibid.). In short, a lack of organizational 
slack drives managers’ attention toward internal political bargaining, thereby 
undermining the continuity between prior R&D commitments and current R&D 
initiatives. Conversely, as organizational slack is an indication that organizations 
have performed favorably in the past (Cyert & March, 1963), managers perceive 
their prior commitment of resources positively by focusing their attention on 
whatever progress or achievements earned through their prior R&D commitments 
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to the extent that more organizational slack is available. We therefore argue that 
managers are more likely to sustain (and even increase) resources allocated to 
their prior R&D commitments to the extent that more organizational slack is 
available. Put differently, organizational slack reinforces the positive relationship 
between prior R&D commitments and current R&D initiatives by allowing 
managers to focus their attention on potential business opportunities uncovered 
by their prior R&D initiatives or vested rights endowed through prior R&D 
commitments. 
It is important to note that organizational slack does not directly influence 
managers’ decisions concerning current R&D initiatives. Put differently, managers 
don’t increase current R&D spending just because they have more resources. 
Successful R&D requires continuous commitments of resources (O'Brien, 2003). 
Accordingly, the temporal availability of resources influences current R&D 
initiatives only marginally. Rather, organizational slack, by influencing managers’ 
attention, determines the degree to which current R&D initiatives follow 
commitments made in prior R&D initiatives. As such, organizational slack 
reinforces (or disturbs) the mechanism in which prior R&D commitments 
influence current R&D initiatives. Accordingly, we argue that organizational slack 
reinforces the positive relationship between prior R&D commitments and current 
R&D initiatives. This leads to our first proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: Organizational slack positively moderates a positive 
relationship between prior R&D commitments and current R&D initiatives such 
that the more organizational slack is available, the more positively prior R&D 
commitments are associated with current R&D initiatives. 
 
IV. Competitive adaptations 
Organizations do not necessarily make resource allocation decisions in 
reaction to internal considerations alone. They also monitor their competitive 
environments to make decisions for more appropriate adaptations in response to 
their competitors’ initiatives. For example, decisions to allocate more resources to 
R&D may be made in reaction to their competitors’ aggressive R&D initiatives. 
Such a motivation is also an important driver of organizations’ resource allocations 
to R&D activities. 
One important assumption underlying this argument is that organizations 
properly monitor and identify changes in their competitors’ R&D initiatives. In 
other words, competitors’ aggressive R&D initiatives do not influence the focal 
organization’s R&D initiatives unless the focal organization recognizes 
competitors’ initiatives precisely. Without knowing which competitors aggressively 
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pursue their R&D and to what extent, there is no way that the focal organization 
can respond to them. As such, organizational R&D motivated by competitive 
adaptations is sometimes constrained by the presence of organizational slack, 
because organizational slack undermines organizations’ capacity to be alert to 
environmental variations by directing managers’ attention to internal issues 
rather than external changes, variations, or progress. 
Organizational slack buffers organizations from variations in external 
environments (Thompson, 1967). This is due to the fact that organizations 
characterized by organizational slack can weather environmental changes by 
adjusting their stock of organizational slack (Cyert & March, 1963; O'Brien, 2003). 
For example, organizations can reduce excess costs (i.e., organizational slack) to 
bump up their financial performance. Excess inventory may also enable 
organizations to buffer themselves from fluctuations in demand. Put differently, 
managers enact their competitive environments as stable and benign to the extent 
that they have more available excess resources (as organizational slack) to buffer 
themselves from external changes, variations, and progress. Conversely, 
organizations that continuously experience so poor performance as to deplete their 
excess resources to the extent that their survival is in doubt are likely to shift their 
attention to their close competitors in an attempt to learn from those competitors’ 
successful experience by imitating their strategies (Blettner et al., 2015). 
Consequently, organizations characterized by organizational slack grow less 
sensitive and adaptive to environmental changes (Cheng & Kesner, 1997; Smith et 
al., 1991). Their managers focus their attention on internal issues including 
efficiency increases, internal consistency between various tasks and procedures, 
and the enforcement of internal controls. Accordingly, we argue that 
organizational slack negatively moderates the positive relationship between 
competitors’ R&D initiatives and the focal organization’s R&D initiatives such 
that organizational slack weakens the positive relationship between competitors’ 
R&D initiatives and the focal organization’s R&D by driving managers’ attention 
away from external changes, variations, and progress. 
It is important to note that organizational slack does not directly discourage 
managers to actively pursue their R&D initiatives. Organizational slack shifts the 
locus of managers’ attention from external issues to internal issues, which then 
disturbs (or even attenuates) the mechanisms by which competitors’ R&D 
initiatives influence the degree to which the focal organization aggressively 
pursues R&D. 
 
Proposition 2: Organizational slack negatively moderates a positive 
relationship between competitors’ R&D initiatives and the focal organization’s 
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R&D initiatives such that the more organizational slack is available, the less 
positively competitors’ R&D initiatives are associated with the focal organization’s 
R&D initiatives. 
 
V. Attainment discrepancy 
Our discussion above assumes that managers’ decisions regarding R&D 
initiatives are the consequence of rational consideration. However, behavioral 
characteristics are also important drivers of organizations’ motivations regarding 
R&D (Cyert & March, 1963). For example, organizations search for alternative 
approaches in executing tasks to the extent that they experience performance 
shortfalls, or more formally, attainment discrepancy (Cyert & March, 1963; Lant, 
1992; Lant & Montgomery, 1987). Attainment discrepancy is a gap between 
organizations’ performance aspirations (or targets) and realized performance. 
When organizations experience attainment discrepancy, they try to address 
performance shortfalls by searching for alternative approaches with the hope that 
they may be able to effectively address their performance problems (Bromiley, 
1991; Cyert & March, 1963; Gaba & Joseph, 2013; Greve, 1998, 2003, 2008; Lim & 
McCann, 2014). Scholars refer to this as problemistic search, which is “search that 
is stimulated by a problem (usually a rather specific one) and is directed toward 
finding a solution to that problem” (Cyert & March, 1963:121). Put differently, 
organizations actively pursue R&D as problemistic search to the extent that they 
realize that their actual performance falls short of their performance aspirations. 
However, performance shortfalls alone are not enough to motivate 
organizations to pursue R&D. This is because increases in R&D initiatives entail a 
certain amount of risks and uncertainty that may discourage managers from 
committing their resources to R&D. In other words, managers are able to search 
for less risky alternatives, including increases in advertising, price adjustments, 
and shifts in sales reps allocations. Although performance gains from such 
alternatives may be incremental improvements at best with only modest 
performance contributions, whereas successful R&D often improves 
organizational competitiveness substantially, managers are notoriously 
risk-averse (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; March, 1991), thereby choosing less 
uncertain incremental improvements. Disappointing performance or the 
likelihood of future decline may pressure managers to search for alternative 
approaches, but there must be something more to strongly motivate managers to 
pursue more or less uncertain R&D initiatives rather than less risky alternatives. 
This is why we argue that the positive relationship between attainment 
discrepancy and R&D initiatives is positively moderated by organizational slack 
such that organizational slack reinforces the positive relationship between 
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attainment discrepancy and R&D initiatives. This is because organizational slack 
increases managers’ risk tolerance by lowering their threshold for accepting 
proposals for initiatives with risky and uncertain consequences. Put differently, 
organizational slack drives managers’ attention toward their attainment 
discrepancy, or away from the increased risks entailed in R&D initiatives targeted 
to identifying alternative solutions. First, organizational slack loosens controls 
placed on potential R&D initiatives because even if they fail in the initiative 
funded by excess resources, current business is not critically damaged. 
Organizational slack also relieves managers’ concerns regarding possible failures 
because organizational survival is not severely jeopardized when excess resources 
are sufficiently available. Consequently, managers accept even risky projects that 
would not have been accepted in a condition of resource scarcity. Secondly, 
organizational slack resolves internal conflicts over the choice regarding resource 
allocation by allowing the pursuit of sub-goals that may not be accepted in a 
condition of resource scarcity. Accordingly, mangers are less critical of each other’s 
initiatives, thereby enabling the further pursuit of initiatives characterized as 
risky and uncertain. Thirdly, as an indication of prior success, organizational slack 
renders managers more confident and optimistic about their likelihood of survival 
and prosperity. Put differently, organizational slack undermines healthy 
skepticism among managers. This may lead to excessively aggressive risk-taking. 
In short, managers enact their organizational contexts as less characterized by 
risk and uncertainty to the extent that they have more organizational slack. 
Conversely, a lack of organizational slack may amplify the sense of threat 
perceived by managers with attainment discrepancy by focusing their attention on 
the likelihood of organizational decline. This sense of threat discourages risk 
taking (Staw, Sandelands & Dutton, 1981), thereby weakening the positive 
relationship between attainment discrepancy and R&D initiatives. 
For all of these reasons, organizational slack reinforces the positive 
associations between attainment discrepancy and R&D initiatives by driving 
managers’ attention toward attainment discrepancy, or away from the risks 
entailed in experimenting with new alternatives. Put differently, managers try to 
address their performance shortfalls more vigorously to the extent that 
organizational slack attenuates their attention to possible failures, 
disappointments, and further attainment discrepancy. 
 
Proposition 3: Organizational slack positively moderates a positive 
relationship between attainment discrepancy and R&D initiatives such that the 
more organizational slack is available, the more positively attainment discrepancy 
is associated with R&D initiatives. 
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VI. Discussion 
In this manuscript, we aim to address one of the major research gaps 
concerning organizational slack’s influence on R&D initiatives. Findings from the 
prior research are inconclusive and confusing, in that scholars argue for a positive, 
a negative, as well as a curvilinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between 
organizational slack and R&D initiatives. No organization is without 
organizational slack. Furthermore, R&D plays increasingly important roles in 
today’s dynamically changing, competitive environment. Therefore, it is of 
theoretical as well as practical importance to understand the relationship between 
organizational slack and R&D initiatives more precisely. 
Our approach to reconciling these contradictory findings is to take into 
account differential motivations and underlying mechanisms for organizations to 
undertake R&D. We focus in particular on three of the most typical motivations for 
R&D, including the pursuit of potential business opportunities, competitive 
adaptations, and attainment discrepancy. Building on prior work, we argue that 
organizational slack differentially influences R&D depending on its underlying 
motivations and mechanisms. Organizational slack reinforces a positive 
relationship between potential business opportunities uncovered by prior R&D 
commitments and current R&D initiatives by driving managers’ attention away 
from internal political bargaining. On the other hand, organizational slack 
weakens adaptive responses to competitors’ R&D initiatives because 
organizational slack buffers (or blinds) organizations from variations in the 
external environment. In other words, managers’ attention to external changes, 
variations, and progress is attenuated by increases in organizational slack. 
Furthermore, managers are willing to address their attainment discrepancy by 
searching for alternative solutions through R&D to the extent that more 
organizational slack is available. This is because managers grow less concerned 
with taking risks to the extent that their organization is characterized by 
organizational slack. Organizational slack draws managers’ attention toward 
attainment discrepancy, and away from the potential risks entailed in pursuing 
R&D initiatives more aggressively. 
Our findings inform future inquiries into the relationship between 
organizational slack and R&D initiatives by calling scholars’ attention to the 
importance of taking into account the motivations and underlying mechanisms for 
R&D. We argue that the relationship is more complicated than that presumed in 
prior work. The inconclusive and confused findings in the prior work show that it 
is highly unlikely that the relationship is as simple as a direct relationship. As 
such, R&D initiatives must be disentangled by carefully examining their 
underlying motivations and mechanisms. We conclude this manuscript by 
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discussing some of the important implications of our findings. Theoretical as well 
as practical implications are discussed in turn below. 
 
1. Theoretical implications 
First, our arguments inform our future efforts to reconcile the contradictory 
findings in prior work. We show that organizational slack may influence R&D both 
positively and negatively depending on organizations’ motivations in pursuing 
their R&D initiatives. Put differently, the relationship between organizational 
slack and R&D initiatives may vary to the extent that organizations are 
characterized by varying combinations of various motivations for R&D. 
Organizations that strongly pursue R&D motivated by potential business 
opportunities or by problemistic search show more positive influences of 
organizational slack on their R&D. On the other hand, organizations 
characterized by the competitive adaptation of R&D reveal more negative 
influences of their organizational slack on R&D. In practice, organizational R&D 
initiatives are motivated by some mixture of these three motivations, in addition 
to others. Therefore, the relationship between organizational slack and R&D 
depends on the varied composition of the various motivations underlying R&D 
initiatives. Accordingly, our findings show that it is important to take account of 
organizations’ motivations and underlying mechanisms when we examine the 
relationship between organizational slack and R&D initiatives. 
The aforementioned finding that the relationship between organizational 
slack and R&D initiatives varies depending on the motivations regarding R&D 
implies that the relationship between organizational slack and R&D may not be 
direct. As we argued above, organizational slack drives, shifts, or attenuates 
managerial attention, which then influences managers’ decision-making 
concerning R&D initiatives. Put differently, we depart from the perspective of 
prior work by arguing for the moderating effects of organizational slack on 
organizational mechanisms that either increase or decrease R&D initiatives. 
Needless to say, organizational slack does not influence organizational 
performance without managers’ decision to deploy organizational slack for some 
purpose or other. The prior research assumes that organizational slack directly 
influences R&D initiatives, but this assumption is inappropriate, as it ignores the 
critical roles managers play in making resource deployment decisions. Our 
argument recognizes the critical roles played by organizational decision-makers by 
explicitly discussing their motivations to pursue R&D, one of the major initiatives 
involved in resource commitment, as well as how their motivations are influenced 
by the presence of organizational slack. As such, although we developed our 
argument in the context of R&D, it may be possible to generalize our findings to 
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inform future inquiries concerning the influences of organizational slack on 
organizational performance in general. 
Put differently, our findings indicate that we cannot explain the influences of 
organizational slack properly if we only focus on the aspect that organizational 
slack is excess or unused resources. Prior work has ignored the critical connection 
between organizational slack and managerial attention by understanding 
organizational slack simply as excess resources. The argument goes that excess 
resources allow managers to spend more, so the relationship between 
organizational slack and R&D should be a positive one. However, if organizational 
slack is simply excess resources, we cannot explain the reason why the 
relationship between competitors’ R&D initiatives and the focal organization’s 
R&D initiatives is attenuated by organizational slack. Another stream of the prior 
work has adopted the perspective that organizational slack comprises resources 
that are not used effectively; from this, scholars infer that managers are so 
risk-averse that organizational slack is negatively associated with R&D initiatives. 
If this were the case, it would be difficult to explain the reason why organizational 
slack reinforces a positive relationship between prior R&D commitments and 
current R&D initiatives. Likewise, the relationship between attainment 
discrepancy and R&D initiatives would also be weakened by organizational slack. 
As such, it would be difficult to coherently and consistently explain the influences 
of organizational slack on R&D initiatives without accounting for the close 
connection between organizational slack and managerial attention. Furthermore, 
these two streams imply fundamentally different assumptions regarding the 
characteristics of organizational slack; by combining two contradictory arguments, 
the theoretical validity of the argument for a curvilinear (inverted U-shape) 
relationship between organizational slack and R&D is jeopardized. 
The inconclusive and confused findings made in the prior work suggest that 
unless we go beyond the aspects of organizational slack as excess or unused 
resources, it is difficult to explain the influences of organizational slack precisely. 
Our manuscript is an initial attempt to address the challenge of uncovering a 
hitherto underexamined aspect of organizational slack by paying careful attention 
to the close connection between organizational slack and managerial attention. 
Scholars reveal that organizational slack influences a wide variety of behaviors 
and phenomena associated with organizations, however, there is more to examine 
to explicate the core characteristics of organizational slack. By uncovering the 
influences of organizational slack on managerial attention, we may be able to forge 
more parsimonious and coherent arguments to explain the differences we observe 
in the influences of organizational slack on R&D initiatives. In short, adopting the 
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attention-based view of the firm enables us to deepen our understanding of the 
influences of organizational slack. 
Accordingly, it may be important to understand organizational slack as one of 
the most important determinants of managerial attention. As we argued above, 
organizational slack drives managers’ attention toward continuity of resource 
deployment decisions, issues inside the organization, and the resolution of 
performance shortfalls, whereas attention to issues characterized as discontinuous, 
external, and uncertain is attenuated. More generally, it may be possible to argue 
that managers’ attention to the past is attenuated to the extent that 
organizational slack decreases. Conversely, increases in organizational slack 
encourage managers to attenuate their attention to the external environment and 
uncertainty. 
Such a close connection between organizational slack and managerial 
attention is also underscored by the unique characteristics of managerial attention, 
which is “situated” as well as structurally distributed in organizations (Ocasio, 
1997). First, the existence of organizational slack, or resource munificence, is one 
of the most important aspects of organizational contexts in which managers are 
embedded (or situated). Secondly, organizational slack strongly influences the 
structural distribution of attention, as we argue in this manuscript. The prior 
work emphasizes that the usage of organizational slack is at the discretion of 
managers. However, the literature ignores the fact that organizational slack 
strongly influences managers’ decision-making by driving managerial attention in 
specific directions. As the influence of managerial attention is  far-reaching, it is 
critically important to take account of the effects of organizational slack on 
managerial attention as an essential function of organizational slack. In other 
words, it is inappropriate to examine the influences of organizational slack per se 
without evaluating whether organizational slack focuses “the attention of 
organizational decision-makers on an appropriate set of issues and answers” (ibid., 
202). 
Our findings also inform future inquiries into managerial attention. Given 
that the theory of bounded rationality is widely accepted, the importance of paying 
scholarly attention to managerial attention is undeniable. However, irrespective of 
our belief that managerial attention substantially influences organizational 
performance, we still lack a detailed understanding of the mechanisms by which 
managerial attention influences organizational performance. By uncovering 
several avenues through which managerial attention influences organizational 
choices to pursue R&D initiatives, we contribute to promising future inquiry into 
the profound impacts of organizational attention. 
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2. Practical implications 
It also is important to discuss practical implications of our findings. Given 
that the influences of organizational slack differ across differentially motivated 
R&D initiatives, managers are advised to adjust their amount of organizational 
slack in consideration of their R&D strategy. For organizations whose R&D is 
primarily motivated by potential business opportunities identified through prior 
R&D commitments or by recent performance shortfalls, organizational slack 
should be increased to facilitate the more active pursuit of R&D initiatives. By 
contrast, for organizations that primarily pursue R&D as a means of competitive 
adaptation, decreasing organizational slack enables more active pursuit of R&D. 
By definition, organizational slack comprises flexible resources that managers can 
use at their discretion. Our findings, by uncovering the differential influences of 
organizational slack on R&D initiatives, can inform managerial decision-making 
to facilitate more effective deployment of organizational slack. 
Managers may alternatively consider proactively manipulating the 
organizational locus of attention by adjusting their degree of organizational slack. 
Scholars have identified several antecedents of organizational attention. Our 
findings add to these antecedents the extremely influential determinant, i.e., 
organizational slack. For example, it may be possible for managers to vary 
organizational slack to adjust the organizational locus of attention regarding past 
and future, inside and outside of the organization, and certainty and uncertainty. 
Of course, organizational slack is an only one determinant of managerial attention. 
Therefore, it is an interesting avenue for future research that seeks to uncover the 
interaction effects of organizational slack and other antecedents of managerial 
attention, including environmental characteristics, the procedural and structural 
design of organizations, and the existence of influential individuals. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Organizational slack is a prevalent phenomenon: it is difficult to find 
organizations without organizational slack. Furthermore, as excess resources that 
managers can use at their discretion, organizational slack is a particularly 
important class of resources because it amplifies both the favorable and 
unfavorable consequences of managerial decisions. However, the understanding of 
organizational slack’s influences on organizational phenomena remains 
inconclusive and confused, as exemplified by our review of the prior work on the 
relationship between organizational slack and R&D. We hope our manuscript 
stimulates further research on this important construct. 
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